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“A STRIKING THING”
Leadership, Strategic Communications, and Roosevelt’s Great
White Fleet
James R. Holmes

T

he voyage of the U.S. Navy’s “Great White Fleet” constituted an exercise in
personal leadership on the part of President Theodore Roosevelt and in international leadership on the part of a United States announcing its arrival as a
world power. Sixteen battleships, eight armored cruisers, six torpedo-boat destroyers, and associated auxiliaries steamed out of Hampton Roads in December
1
1907, embarking on a world cruise. The fleet rounded South America before
standing out across the Pacific, stopping at a variety of ports of call along the
way. It passed through Malacca, the Bab el Mandeb, Suez, and Gibraltar before
returning home through the Atlantic. The vessels entered harbor in early 1909,
2
allowing “TR” to conclude his presidency on a triumphant note.
The voyage was “a striking thing,” to borrow the president’s words, in more
ways than one. The armada, the largest ever to attempt to circumnavigate the
globe, demonstrated an unprecedented naval capability, defying military experts who pronounced such a feat of seamanship impossible. While at sea, the
ships’ crews honed their tactical proficiency, conducting gunnery practice and
other exercises. While in port, they performed an important diplomatic function. And their exploits fired imaginations back home—which was precisely
3
TR’s intent.
Roosevelt advanced extravagant claims for the nautical enterprise he had superintended. “In my own judgment,” he wrote in his autobiography, “the most important service I rendered to peace was the voyage of the battle fleet round the
world.” This is quite a statement, coming from a Nobel Peace Prize laureate.4 TR
maintained that the cruise had invigorated the American national character,
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renewing Americans’ enthusiasm for seafaring pursuits, and that it had done so
while encouraging sea powers to police their geographic environs and discouraging them from imperial adventures in Asia and the New World.
It is worth revisiting this venture in American diplomatic and naval history
now, precisely a century hence, when the U.S. Navy is again fashioning a maritime strategy predicated on American leadership. To gain some analytical purchase, I briefly review James MacGregor Burns’s theory of leadership. I
introduce the concept of “strategic communications,” observing that the ability
to persuade domestic and foreign audiences is essential to each mode of leadership Burns identifies. I then apply these concepts to the historical record, evaluating the accomplishments TR asserted for the Great White Fleet in his
autobiography. My findings are at once of historical interest and of use for today’s framers of maritime strategy.
Despite his reputation for bombast, TR executed his diplomatic duties with
discretion, taking seriously the “speak softly” element of the West African proverb that inspired his “big stick” philosophy. His approach combined unbending
resolve on matters of principle with compromise on less critical matters, leaven5
ing diplomatic discourses with tact and good humor. Wielded deftly, seagoing
forces clearly make a useful instrument for this sort of statesmanship, beyond
their primary mission of waging war at sea. It behooves naval leaders to understand how basic tenets of leadership pertain to maritime strategy—now, as in
Roosevelt’s day.
JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS AND MARITIME LEADERSHIP
Leadership is normally thought of as an individual quality. This is especially so
when considering a figure like Theodore Roosevelt, whose larger-than-life personality tends to overshadow his policy accomplishments. Most studies of leadership strive to explain how statesmen, soldiers, businessmen, and other
individual leaders inspire their followers, vectoring their energies toward desired ends. Lists of individual traits, coupled with tactics successful leaders purportedly employ, constitute the norm in such studies, many of which have the
feel of how-to manuals. In his classic work on leadership, by contrast, Burns
proffers a richer working definition of this elusive quality: “Leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in combination or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological,
6
and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers.”
Burns divides leadership into two broad categories: “transactional” and
“transformational.” For him, transactional leadership involves exchanging
7
“goods or services or other things in order to realize independent objectives.”
There is clearly a strong material aspect to leadership. Self-interest counts.
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More interesting—and just as relevant to Roosevelt and the expedition of the
Great White Fleet—is transformational leadership. A common assumption
8
about leadership is that leaders lead, followers follow. This imputes a certain
passiveness to subordinates in an institution or group. Defying such assumptions, Burns posits an interactive dynamic between leaders and the led, presupposing a real or latent community of motives and values that leaders can tap.
Whereas transactional leadership, exercised honorably and fairly, can help all
parties to the transaction realize their material aspirations, transformational
leadership “is more concerned with end-values, such as liberty, justice, equality.
9
Transforming leaders ‘raise’ their followers up through levels of morality.”
An interactive relationship also implies that there are limits to leadership.
People are not as malleable as many scholars of leadership suggest. From time to
time TR ran up against these limits—notably in the bitter dispute over Japanese
immigration, which at one point
threatened to precipitate war—as
Theodore Roosevelt’s maritime leadership
10
he grudgingly conceded. If pubincorporated the message that the United
States was a worthy steward of certain universal lic communications can tax the
skills of American presidents,
ideals of good government.
who enjoy a “bully pulpit” by virtue of their office, this is even more true in diplomacy, which by nature represents communication across national and cultural lines. Exerting political
leadership is no simple prospect—but robust seagoing forces can help.
While Roosevelt lacked James MacGregor Burns’s vocabulary for discussing
leadership, he likely would have accepted depiction of himself as a practitioner
of transformational leadership. His writings and speeches are replete with exhortations to moral virtue, “true Americanism,” and the “strenuous life” lived by
11
those possessed of a martial spirit. He regarded public office and the bully pulpit it affords as a medium for social uplift, presaging Burns’s concept of instilling
end-values. Also, while he would have taken a more skeptical view of
transactional leadership, in light of his lifelong crusade against corruption and
patronage, he probably would have acknowledged that offering public goods
was central to effective leadership—both at home and abroad—provided such
goods were bestowed in an aboveboard manner, accountable to the public.
For TR, combining transactional and transformational leadership was intrinsic to prudential statecraft—the art of promoting lofty ideals through
pragmatic means, abiding by the limits of the possible. Burns’s analysis can be
carried a step farther. In the international domain, nations, like statesmen, can
12
exercise transactional and transformational leadership. A nation’s capacity
to do so, particularly in efforts at transformation, is in large measure a function of its leadership’s skill at strategic communications.13 This would have
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been an uncontroversial notion for Roosevelt, who beseeched nations to follow
14
the same standards—notably the Golden Rule—expected of individual citizens.
RENEWING AMERICA’S SEAFARING ETHOS
Now, we turn to some specifics. What benefits accrued from dispatching the battle fleet around the world? “My prime purpose,” declared TR, “was to impress
the American people; and this purpose was fully achieved.”15 His confidant
Alfred Thayer Mahan listed national character—a people’s propensity for nautical endeavors—among his six attributes of sea power. Roosevelt heartily agreed,
although he did not cite Mahan’s works as authority for the healthful effects the
16
world cruise would bring. Much as the Founding Fathers had constructed a
“usable past” to inspire the loyalties of Americans, binding the fractious new Re17
public together, TR hoped to create a new tradition that prized great sea power.
That public sentiment was the propellant for seaborne pursuits must have
seemed self-evident to President Roosevelt, concerned as he was with nurturing
the national character. Turning America’s gaze seaward was his uppermost concern in ordering the Great White Fleet to sea.
Nations too should behave virtuously. Roosevelt transposed his vision of individual virtue into the international realm, holding nations to the same standards as those governing ordinary citizens’ conduct. The better-off in American
society should work to improve the lot of those impoverished during the Industrial Revolution. Just as the doctrine of noblesse oblige enjoined individuals to
exert themselves on behalf of the common good, so governments should maintain order while improving the health, welfare, and morals of the body politic.
Also, just as he saw enlivening and channeling America’s national character in
the right direction as part of his writ in domestic statecraft—Progressive politics allowed the United States to claim its rightful place in the vanguard of “civilization”—
he saw preserving and extending civilization as part of America’s writ in diplomatic and military affairs.
The upshot: TR applied the same principles to both domestic and international affairs. Affirmed Elihu Root, his secretary of war and later his secretary
of state, whom the president affectionately described as “the brutal friend to
18
whom I pay the most attention”:
The fundamental convictions of his political philosophy were in perfect accord with
this way of treating international questions. Those convictions which he applied in
practice to government and social organization were identical with the basis upon
which the law of nations rests and must necessarily rest if it is to endure.19

To employ Burns’s taxonomy of leadership, President Roosevelt’s motives and
purposes in ordering the fleet around the world included stimulating interest and
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enthusiasm for sea power among an American populace that had long avoided foreign political entanglements, allowing its navy to atrophy. Roosevelt admitted his
quest for sea power faced stiff political opposition, concentrated among influential
newspapers and the remnants of the anti-imperialist movement—a movement led
by the likes of Mark Twain and Andrew Carnegie—that had opposed annexing the
20
Philippines.
To overcome determined opposition, TR hoped to encourage and satisfy
what he believed was Americans’ innate propensity to the sea. He summoned up
political and psychological resources. Transactional leadership played its part.
Like Mahan, Roosevelt pointed out that sea power conferred tangible benefits,
including not only the safety of American shores from foreign naval attack but
also assured access to the international trade and commerce on which an economy wracked by depression—the 1893 crash was comparable to the Great
Depression—seemed to depend. Mahan had depicted commerce, overseas
21
bases, and merchant as well as military shipping as the “pillars” of sea power.
Self-interest beckoned America to the oceans after a century of apathy toward
the republic’s aquatic surroundings.
TR also put his bully pulpit to good use, giving his exercise of leadership
strong transformational overtones. He appealed to Americans’ sense of national
mission as well as to their commercial and security interests. Elihu Root aptly
described Roosevelt’s approach to strategic communications toward domestic
audiences. Root observed that what Roosevelt called “the peace of justice” rested
22
on two grounds: first, his conviction that “a very rich people incapable of defending its independence and its citizens against aggression” would tempt “some
other nation of predatory instincts” to prey upon it, and second, his belief that
no nation can exercise a helpful influence upon the development of civilization unless it commands the respect which follows from a recognition that its adherence to
peaceful methods and its regard for the rights of others comes from power controlled
by justice and not from weakness controlled by fear. The sending of the battleship
fleet around the world was a gesture designed to strike the imagination of the nations
including the United States with a conviction that this was the kind of judgment to
which the United States was entitled.23

Theodore Roosevelt’s effort at maritime leadership, then, incorporated the
message not only that the United States was entitled to defend its own national
interests—practitioners of realpolitik conceded this right to all nation-states—
but also that it was a worthy steward of certain universal ideals of good government, namely, those embedded in his Progressive politics. The cruise of the
Great White Fleet telegraphed this message to domestic audiences in vivid
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terms, earning acclaim even from many staunch opponents of his assertive for24
eign policy.
GIVING SUBSTANCE TO THE MONROE DOCTRINE
Impressing foreign peoples was likewise important, observed Roosevelt, and
“positive achievement” was the best way to do so. The “two American achievements that really impressed foreign peoples during the first dozen years of this
century [were] the digging of the Panama Canal and the cruise of the battle fleet
around the world.”25 He might have added that conjoining these endeavors with
a forceful interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine helped rouse popular support
at home for an ambitious, maritime-intensive foreign policy.
26
In 1904, Roosevelt fashioned a “corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine. When
the Dominican Republic defaulted on its foreign debt and European intervention seemed imminent, TR informed Congress that “chronic wrongdoing” or
“governmental impotence” preventing Caribbean governments from meeting
27
their foreign obligations warranted preventive U.S. intervention. The United
States would forestall violations of the doctrine by stepping in itself. “If we are
willing to let Germany or England act as the policeman of the Caribbean,” proclaimed Roosevelt, “then we can afford not to interfere when gross wrongdoing
occurs. But if we intend to say ‘Hands Off ’ to the powers of Europe, then sooner
28
or later we must keep order ourselves.”
He therefore claimed the right to deploy “an international police power”
when governmental incompetence in the Caribbean basin threatened to leave
American territory in the hands of European powers—especially Kaiser Wilhelm’s
Germany. In TR’s day, a common practice among the great powers was to send
warships to seize the customhouses of weak American governments that had refused or been unable to honor their foreign debts. Europeans would use these
governments’ tariff revenues—their chief source of income—to repay their aggrieved creditors. This left imperial powers in possession of American territory—
territory that could be used to base warships. Roosevelt feared Europeans would
use debt collection as an excuse to establish naval bases in the Caribbean basin,
endangering the independence of American republics and the vital American
interest in free navigation.
Indeed, the geostrategic value of secure sea communications with the Isthmus of Panama, a geographic feature Mahan had described as the “gateway to
29
the Pacific for the United States,” could hardly be overstated. A canal would
spare commercial or naval shipping originating in East Coast ports the arduous
voyage around South America. American ships would enjoy more direct communications with the modest Pacific empire won from Spain in 1898, not to
mention easier access to the China trade. Last but not least, the U.S. Navy could
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concentrate its Atlantic and Pacific fleets far more readily—bolstering the battle
fleet’s ability to discharge its defense and police duties in critical waterways.
TR thus did not regard the doctrine as a pretext for U.S. hegemony over the
30
Western Hemisphere—or so he said; it was, rather, an expression of American
31
leadership of a joint defense against European great-power pretensions. He
questioned whether democratic regimes could sustain consistent policies; the
doctrine offered a rare standard around which to rally Americans for grand
foreign-policy enterprises. Accordingly, he declared that “it would be well were
we sufficiently farsighted steadily to shape our policy with the view to the ultimate removal of all European powers from the colonies they hold in the western
hemisphere.”32 He assumed that all American republics shared an interest in preventing Europe from partitioning the Americas, as it had much of Asia and Africa.
Sending to sea a U.S. Navy able to fend off European encroachment thus advanced mutual security objectives. To assuage fears of American hegemony,
however, American statesmen had to communicate clearly that their nation had
no desire to dominate its neighbors politically or militarily, taking on a hegemonic role of its own. This was a
real fear in Latin America. In
For TR, combining transactional and
1895, Richard Olney, President
transformational leadership was intrinsic to
Grover Cleveland’s secretary of
prudential statecraft.
state, had injected himself—
uninvited—into a territorial dispute between Venezuela and British Guiana. The American “fiat [was] law” on
matters it deemed of vital interest, decreed Olney—primarily because the U.S.
33
Navy could enforce America’s will throughout the hemisphere. He cited the
Monroe Doctrine as authority for this “fiat,” illustrating how Monroe’s defensive precepts could be abused to justify meddling in Latin American affairs.
Roosevelt, by contrast, declared that he wanted to interfere in fellow American republics as little as possible, consistent with such goals as digging the
34
all-important isthmian canal. He accentuated the self-restraint implicit in his
international police power—foreshadowing his emphasis on the Great White
Fleet’s constabulary mission. “I want to do nothing but what a policeman has to
do” in the Dominican Republic, he assured his friend Joseph Bucklin Bishop,
who had questioned his motives for intervening on the island. “As for annexing
the island, I have about the same desire to annex it as a gorged boa constrictor
35
might have to swallow a porcupine wrong-end-to.” Furthermore, he disavowed
plans for thrusting wide-ranging reform on the island: “If I possibly can I want
to do nothing to them. If it is absolutely necessary to do something, then I want
36
to do as little as possible.”
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In effect he wanted to show Latin Americans that they were not replacing one
imperial menace—Europe—with another one far closer to home. In 1906, he
sent Secretary of State Root on a goodwill tour of the region. Thomas Bailey
credits Root’s diplomacy, coupled with the numerous South American port vis37
its of the battle fleet in 1907–1908, with easing worries about U.S. intentions.
Dr. Luis Drago, the Argentine foreign minister, summarized the Monroe Doctrine as “the traditional policy [by which] the United States without accentuating superiority or seeking preponderance condemned the oppression of the
nations of this part of the world and the control of their destinies by the great
Powers of Europe.” TR congratulated Drago for discerning the “true attitude” of
38
the United States toward its southern neighbors.
DETERRING AND CONCILIATING JAPAN
Demonstrating strength, responsibility, and forbearance was at the core of Roosevelt’s Asia policy as well. TR was a great admirer of Japan, which had vaulted
into the front rank of progressive civilization within a few generations of its
opening to the outside world. The Japanese—unlike the Chinese, who were enduring a prolonged period of decay, weakness, and imperial exploitation that
aroused TR’s contempt—embodied the manly virtues he extolled. “What wonderful people the Japanese are!” he exclaimed to his friend Cecil Arthur Spring
Rice, a British diplomat. “They are quite as remarkable industrially as in warfare.
39
. . . [Japan] is now a great power and will be a greater power.” Consequently, “I
wish to see the United States treat the Japanese in a spirit of all possible courtesy,
40
and with generosity and justice.”
Indeed, TR considered Japan a worthy partner in the advanced nations’ effort
to police the developing world. During the Boxer Rebellion of 1900–1901, for instance, Roosevelt hoped that Japan would join the Western powers to intervene
41
in China, chastening those he regarded as bandits. (Tokyo did deploy troops as
part of the German-led expeditionary force.) Giddy at the success of Japanese
arms against Russia in 1904, when the Imperial Japanese Navy smashed a Russian fleet at Tsushima, Roosevelt proclaimed that Japan had a “paramount interest”
in the Yellow Sea basin similar to the one the United States claimed in the Caribbean. “I thought it for the interest of all the world,” he reported telling one Japanese
42
official, “that each part of the world should be prosperous and well policed.”
In Burns’s terms, Roosevelt believed a community of interest united Japan
with the Western world. He wanted to entrust this new Asian power (along with
certain nations in Europe and the Americas) with the same international police
authority he had reserved for the United States in his corollary to the Monroe
Doctrine. Accordingly, notes Bailey, “throughout the cruise the function of the
43
navy as a police force and not as a threat was constantly emphasized.” (To be
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sure, Roosevelt’s narrative of the cruise as an innocuous venture was not universally embraced. Warned Commander Taniguchi Naomi, the Japanese naval
attaché in Washington, “The cruise was aimed at not only enhancement of mili44
tary efficiency in time of war but also implicitly at intimidating Japan.”) In a
very real sense, then, the voyage presaged today’s efforts to assemble a Global
Maritime Partnership to police regional seas for terrorists, pirates, and traffickers in weapons-related goods.
Whether a fleet of armored, heavily gunned men-of-war built for Mahanian
fleet actions offered the best tool for international police work was another
question—hence Tokyo’s ambivalence toward TR’s foray into maritime leadership. Then as now, reconciling navies’ war-fighting and constabulary functions
was a delicate matter. However successful his attempt to organize international
police efforts might be, Roosevelt realized that great-power policemen would
themselves need policing should their realpolitik ambitions overreach. His solu45
tion was to build up countervailing power as a strategic hedge. Demonstrating
the U.S. Navy’s capacity to fight in Asian waters, he believed, would deter Japanese adventurism while consolidating the shared interests he believed had coalesced with Japan’s entry into the civilized world. Of the world cruise, he stated,
46
“I regard it really as a peace measure.”
Encouraging Japan to assume a leadership role of its own while discouraging
it from using maritime leadership as a pretext for territorial conquest was essential. Proving the United States could defend the islands wrested from Spain in
1898—in particular the Philippine Islands, the platform for American sea power
in Asia—was central to Roosevelt’s Japan policy and strategy. The islands
brought great geopolitical advantages to an America jealous of its share of the
China trade, but they also threatened to embroil the United States in controversies or even conflict. “The Philippines form our heel of Achilles,” lamented TR.
“They are all that makes the present situation with Japan dangerous.” Possessing
the Philippines without maintaining a fleet able to carry the fight into Asian seas
47
would represent “a veritable national calamity.”
The need to convince Tokyo that the U.S. Navy could hold the Philippines imparted a distinct operational component to TR’s exercise of maritime leadership. One of the president’s foremost concerns was to dampen the euphoria with
which the Japanese had celebrated their naval victory over Russia. Defeating a
European great power, he feared, might strengthen the hand of militarists in Tokyo,
emboldening them to attempt new conquests that would bring their nation into
conflict with Western powers. Geography had conspired against Russia, compelling the tsars to divide their navy. The Imperial Japanese Navy had exploited
Russia’s fragmentary naval power, using local supremacy to defeat first the Russian Pacific Squadron, then the Baltic Fleet Moscow dispatched in relief.
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Like Russia, the United States maintained fleets on opposite coasts, violating
the Mahanian maxim that a fleet should operate as a unified whole. TR feared
the Tsushima analogy would encourage Japan to embark on military expansion
inimical to the Philippines, America’s geostrategic Achilles’ heel, or to U.S. com48
mercial and diplomatic interests in continental Asia. “If any one lesson is taught
by the Russo-Japanese war, and indeed by naval history generally,” Roosevelt asserted, “it is that in the effort to protect even two important points a division of
49
force may mean the failure to protect either and the final loss of the war.”
He admitted there was some geostrategic risk to leaving American coasts unguarded during the world cruise, but he insisted that “I will not leave in one
ocean a considerable fragment of the fleet, not enough to stand by itself, but
enough to greatly weaken by its absence the remainder of the fleet.” The virtues
of concentration, he maintained, were “elemental.”50 To assure the Great White
Fleet enjoyed a preponderance of force over the Imperial Japanese Navy,
I want our fleet to be a unit. If there is war we must run the risk of raids on the Atlantic coast and accept the inevitable howl that will come, merely using such monitors
and torpedo vessels as are available, together with any unarmored cruisers, to try to
protect the Atlantic coast. When our fleet goes to the Pacific I want every battleship
and armored cruiser that can be sent to go.51

President Roosevelt downplayed European predictions that Japan would attack the U.S. fleet as it passed, setting back the cause of American sea power. At
the same time, he took this slight possibility seriously, asking Admiral Willard
Herbert Brownson “whether, if a war was started, we could build battleships
during the course of a year or eighteen months, so that if the war lasted that
length of time we could begin to have ships take the place of those we should
52
lose.” He also inquired whether the United States could stall for time, working
53
around Japan’s Mahanian naval strategy:
The German and English experts evidently believe that in the event of war, which
they (as I hope and believe, wrongly) think inevitable, the Japanese would at first
avoid a general engagement and trust to torpedo attacks and the like, and the long
distance from our base, gradually to wear our fleet down. Under such circumstances
I should like to know whether we could not ourselves play a waiting game by taking
advantage of the delay and our enormous wealth to build up the fleet.54

TR understood there were economic, industrial, and geographic elements to
a viable strategic-communications campaign vis-à-vis Tokyo. Japanese strategists expected the U.S. Navy to surge out across the Pacific in wartime, steaming
toward a Tsushima-like fleet engagement in Asian waters. Roosevelt sought to
deflate such expectations. If the United States deferred its offensive, it could exploit its vast material resources to build a navy capable of overcoming the
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tyranny of distance in the Pacific—and Japan’s attrition strategy—by virtue of
numbers. So the world cruise was something of a gamble, but at least, reasoned
55
TR, the fleet would be concentrated if trouble did come. Employed wisely, a
credible navy held major psychological potential, lending weight to his courteous yet firm Big Stick diplomacy.
A cautionary note is in order. The results of the world cruise vis-à-vis Japan
remain a matter of some dispute among historians. As discussed before, Burns
postulated an interactive relationship between leaders and led. This dynamic
sort of relationship is even more evident in international affairs, a milieu in
which the protagonists—nation-states—are formal equals possessing fewer incentives or disincentives than those available to leaders in an authority
relationship.
The Japanese, in short, were not mere passive objects of American leadership,
no matter how impressively or tactfully conducted. Whereas Bailey depicts the
naval diplomacy carried on by the Great White Fleet as an almost unvarnished
success, Howard K. Beale holds out the possibility that the fleet achieved only
short-term diplomatic gains, and only at the cost of empowering Japanese militarists over the long term. Determined never again to see their nation overawed by
the United States, this faction launched Japan into the militarized foreign policy
56
that culminated in World War II. Without taking sides in this debate, it is fair to
say that practitioners of U.S. maritime strategy should recognize the limits to nautical diplomacy, not to mention its unforeseen—perhaps unforeseeable—consequences. What may look to Americans like a friendly yet firm display of naval
force can look far different to foreign eyes.
LEADERSHIP IS FOR THE BOLD
Theodore Roosevelt saw seagoing forces as an instrument to help uphold vital
American interests, discourage territorial aggrandizement on the part of rival
great powers, and spread the blessings of civilization among the less advanced
nations, primarily those adjoining important waterways. In James MacGregor
Burns’s formula for leadership, the journey of the Great White Fleet served dual
transactional and transformational purposes. The U.S. Navy represented an important resource at TR’s command. According to proponents of the cruise, port
visits and exercises proved that the United States could project force not only
throughout critical waters in the Western Hemisphere but also into Asia, where
the rise of Japan might hold the islands wrung from Spain at risk. In short, the
Navy offered a potent deterrent against European or Japanese pretensions, lending persuasive force to American diplomacy.
With regard to transformation, fostering wide acceptance of the concept that
naval forces could perform constabulary duty, furthering the cause of
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civilization, was central to TR’s maritime leadership. His success depended on
the existence of sentiments among the advanced powers favorable to the endvalues expressed in his corollary to the Monroe Doctrine. Guarding against governmental incompetence or malfeasance in the less advanced world, believed
Roosevelt, was an interest common to all advanced nations. During the voyage,
accordingly, administration spokesmen stressed the capacity of great-power naval forces to police a nation’s geographic environs. To ward off the perils implicit
in codifying a right of international intervention, the president hoped a balance
of naval power would check the ambitions of advanced nations tempted to pursue imperial expansion under the guise of police action.
It is fitting to round out an assessment of Theodore Roosevelt and the Great
White Fleet with some observations about Roosevelt’s personal leadership characteristics. While TR valued consensus in international affairs, he also reserved
the option of acting alone—even preventively, under his corollary—should a
lack of consensus obstruct what
he saw as the correct course of acThe armada, the largest ever to attempt to cirtion. He believed domestic and
cumnavigate the globe, demonstrated an unforeign audiences would ratify his
precedented naval capability.
policies if those policies yielded
concrete accomplishments. His
bias toward action—Henry Adams famously described him as “pure act,” while
Carl Schurz, vice president of the Anti-Imperialist League, marveled at his “master nature”—is worth bearing in mind when formulating and executing mari57
time strategy. If conducted adeptly, naval diplomacy can advance transactional
and transformational goals vis-à-vis both domestic and foreign audiences.
Roosevelt’s philosophy of decisive leadership manifested itself clearly in the
cruise of the Great White Fleet. “I determined on the move,” he recalled in his
autobiography, “without consulting the Cabinet. A council of war never fights,
and in a crisis the duty of a leader is to lead and not to take refuge behind the
58
timid wisdom of a multitude of councilors.” He also dared congressional opponents of the voyage to make good on their threat to defund it. “The fleet is to
go to the Pacific,” proclaimed TR, and it would stay there if Congress declined to
59
appropriate funds for its return. Because of the factors examined previously—
the need to show that the battle fleet could circumnavigate the globe, the need to
conciliate Latin America and deter Japan—he acted with his customary vigor,
60
leaving it to the American people and posterity to render judgment.
TR professed confidence that history would vindicate his handling of American foreign relations. In his final message to Congress, delivered in December
1908, the president proclaimed that his approach had derived from “the theory
that right must be done between nations precisely as between individuals.” He
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invited historians to scrutinize his and the nation’s efforts at leadership, maintaining that “in our actions for the last ten years we have in this matter proven
61
our faith by our deeds.” For architects of contemporary U.S. maritime strategy:
scrutinize away. Some insights from the Roosevelt era worth factoring into today’s strategic deliberations:

• U.S. maritime power offers a solid foundation for multinational police work.
American seagoing forces, not only the U.S. Navy but the Coast Guard,
can help Washington exercise transactional and transformational leadership. Despite its decline in numbers, the Navy remains preeminent in
Asia, supplying the international public good of maritime security for rising powers like China and India as well as such lesser powers as those
ringing the South China Sea. This frees Asian governments to apply national resources to economic development rather than large military
forces. Over time, moreover, cooperation between the United States and
the Asian nations on matters such as maritime counterterrorism and
counterproliferation may give rise to an international norm opposing
these universal scourges—much as TR hoped regional sea powers would
police their neighborhoods.

• National interests and perspectives intersect with police work. U.S. naval leaders should keep Burns’s apt depiction of leadership as an interactive process
squarely in view. While it might seem uncontroversial to Americans, for example, policing regional waters for items usable for building nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons or ballistic missiles poses problems for some
governments. As China becomes more and more dependent on the seas for
energy security, Chinese leaders are increasingly wary of entrusting the security of vital sea lanes to the perhaps-fleeting goodwill of the United
States. Even India, which appears amenable to a strategic maritime partnership
with the United States and certainly covets the operational and tactical
benefits of working with the U.S. Navy and Coast Guard, would likely balk
at any arrangement implying that New Delhi had accepted junior status in
the Indian Ocean—its rightful sphere of predominance, in Indian eyes. Assent in putatively universal ideals such as counterproliferation is far from a
foregone conclusion—much as U.S.-Japanese cooperation proved elusive in
the early twentieth century.

• Show how high-end capabilities contribute to police efforts. U.S. leaders should
consider the psychological impact of big-deck aircraft carriers—the latter-day
counterparts to TR’s battleships—on foreign audiences. Explaining the uses of
these behemoths for endeavors that promote common interests would advance
U.S. strategic communications—and thus the cause of American maritime
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leadership. TR mentioned, but only in passing, that the Great White Fleet
had paused on its homeward voyage to render assistance to earthquake victims
63
in Messina. This was an uncharacteristic oversight on his part. Today’s Navy
should make better diplomatic use of its nontraditional missions. The 2004–
2005 tsunami relief operation, for example, underscored the multiple missions
entrusted to U.S. naval forces. The future of any American-led seagoing partnership could depend as much on diplomatic skill as on operational and tactical
proficiency.
Effective strategic communications is the common denominator in
transactional and transformational leadership. Deterring foreign sea powers
while conciliating them is a delicate task. In Burns’s terms, arousing, engaging,
and satisfying the motives of skeptical powers such as China will challenge even
the best practitioners of strategic communications. Nor is success guaranteed. If
China, India, or some other prospective partner repeatedly rejects American
overtures, other motives may be at work. Even failed efforts to exercise maritime
leadership, however, can produce useful results. Whatever the case, there is no
substitute for sustained, painstaking diplomacy on the part of statesmen and naval leaders. International police work depends on it.
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